

2003

Nuclearization of Pakistan: Motivations and Intentions

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Nuclearization of Pakistan

Motivations and Intentions

(TITLE)

BY

Rabia Akhtar

THESIS

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF

Master of Arts

IN THE GRADUATE SCHOOL, EASTERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY
CHARLESTON, ILLINOIS

2003

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ABSTRACT

Pakistan conducted six thermonuclear tests in response to five Indian nuclear tests in 1998. There existed an interplay of various actors at the external and the internal level which enabled Pakistan to reach the decision to detonate. This thesis examines the motivations and intentions that acted as a driving force for Pakistan to make the decision to go nuclear. In order to identify these intentions, this thesis applies the national decision making model presented by Graham Allison. The arguments presented will demonstrate whether Allison's model explains the complexity of Pakistan's decision to go nuclear and which part of the model best explains the motivations that led Pakistan to respond India in kind. The conclusion of this thesis suggests that Allison's Rational Actor, Organizational Process and the Bureaucratic Politics Models have some usefulness in explaining Pakistan's decision to conduct nuclear tests in 1998. But these models cannot be applied solely to explain the decision-making rather it has to be a combination of all the three models to suggest what motivated Pakistan to detonate.

NUCLEARIZATION OF PAKISTAN
MOTIVATIONS AND INTENTIONS

Rabia Akhtar
Political Science Department
Master's Thesis
Summer 2003

DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my ma and baba for their love, encouragement and the belief they have in me.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis is not a solo effort and for me to take all the credit will not be fair without acknowledging the efforts of all those who made it possible. I would like to thank Dr. Ryan Hendrickson for being my advisor and for his constant encouragement and never tiring support. I am forever indebted for his patience and persistence in helping me with this thesis. I would also like to thank Dr. Andrew McNitt and Dr. David Carwell for agreeing to serve on my committee. Your advice on this thesis has been invaluable. I have benefited from the knowledge and experience that you have shared with me. I would also like to acknowledge Vicky for her love and hugs that got me through this one year. Finally, I would not have imagined completing this thesis without my friends Anda and Victoria. Life is a celebration of friendships that we make along the way in our journey and I was able to realize my dreams in the shape of this thesis because I had you both by my side everyday. Thankyou all for being there.

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INTRODUCTION

The Indian nuclear tests in 1998 irreversibly changed South Asia. Pakistan responded in kind on 28 May 1998. It is now a part of the world where nuclear annihilation shall always be just around the corner. Generations in both Pakistan and India will agonize over why and how it all happened. It was a move calculated to demonstrate nuclear parity with India in which Pakistan carried out five nuclear explosions.

The immediate international response to India's nuclear tests, led by the United States, was to impose sweeping sanctions on India, and to warn Pakistan that similar sanctions would be imposed if Pakistan decided to conduct its own tests. But despite warnings of severe sanctions and aid cut off threats by the International community, Pakistan decided to detonate its nuclear devices. At the time of detonation Pakistan realized that the nuclear sanctions and the threat of isolation from the international community would prove detrimental to her more than it would affect India. Despite this knowledge that Pakistan is a weak economic power and the threats to aid cut off would prove disastrous, these conditions did not deter Pakistan to detonate. Decades of economic mismanagement and mounting debt obligations had made the Pakistani state heavily dependent on multilateral lending and grants to meet its budgetary needs. The U.S. initiated multilateral sanctions and brought the Pakistani economy to the brink of a collapse, threatening an internal and external default.

Pakistan's decision to detonate gives rise to various questions. Given Pakistani knowledge of the economic and diplomatic pain it was willing to accept,

it is important to understand why this decision to follow in India's nuclear footsteps was taken. In order to answer this question this thesis intends to test Graham Allison's models for national decision-making in the case of Pakistan's nuclearization and determine what motivated Pakistan to go nuclear and how they were able to do so.

Allison presented three models for national decision-making, which offers a useful methodology to answer the question in focus. I will examine the three components of Allison's model, which are the Rational Actor model, Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics. The Rational Actor Model will focus on the states self-interest at that time. The Organizational process model will explain how Pakistan acquired the nuclear capability and managed to put the nukes to testing.

The last part of this test will employ the bureaucratic politics model of national decision-making. This section will examine the intentions of the executive branch of policy making. It will also analyze the civil-military relations in Pakistan at the time of nuclear detonation in 1998 so as to make clear as to how much role did the military had to play in the decision making process. It is important to analyze the role military plays in Pakistan because of its overwhelming superiority over the civilian government and its subsequent toppling of the democratic regime in 1999.

After the nuclear testing in South Asia by both India and Pakistan, the concerns centered on the possible arms race in the region and efforts to curtail nuclear proliferation. This thesis is an attempt to provide answers to the

questions that were left unveiled in the wake of the nuclear crises as to what motivated Pakistan to go nuclear beyond the desire to attain the nuclear capability and curb Indian hegemonic designs ,which is the common view taken by the Pakistani government.

This thesis is divided into four parts. The first part provides a literature review and discusses in greater detail Graham Allison's national decision making models and reviews what other authors have written about Allison's contribution to foreign policy decision making. The second part examines the Rational Actor Model and tests this model in case of Pakistan. The Third part deals in Organizational process model to test the means available and the process involved in going nuclear. Although organizational process entails the technicalities of acquiring the nuclear capability it might serve to justify the statements put forth by the Indian government that since Pakistan had the nuclear capability, thus they had to put it to test.

The third part employs the bureaucratic politics model in much greater depth, which includes analysis of the civil-military relationship in 1998. The conclusion will serve to answer the main thesis question as to why did Pakistan go nuclear, and address if Allison's models describe the Pakistani decision making process in 1998 to detonate the nuclear devices.

CHAPTER I

LITERATURE REVIEW

This thesis relies heavily on Graham Allison's model of national decision making in his book *Essence of Decision*.¹ Allison has explained the Cuban missile crisis through three different lenses; the Rational Actor Paradigm, Organizational Behavior Paradigm and Governmental Politics Paradigm, each of which is based on a different set of assumptions. His first model, the Rational Actor model assumes that,

"The actor is a national government and that the action is chosen as a calculated solution to a strategic problem".²

The Rational Actor model is the model that is traditionally used by the students of international relations. According to Allison the Rational Actor model is useful, but to fully comprehend all of the decisions that go into a decision by a state one has to look at both the Organizational Process model and the Bureaucratic model. Rational Actor model conceives of governmental action as a "choice" made by a unitary and rational nation or national government. This model treats national government as an individual identifying problems and producing solutions and alternatives. The virtue of the model comes from its power of explanation especially in case it is able to expose the "purpose" of the nation/state. The policies are made by the nation as a whole and are used for the maximization of strategic goals. It emphasizes that each government is an individual actor with its own goals, options and risk capability. Action is used as a response to problems

¹ Allison, Graham T. *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* Little Brown Company, 1971.

² Ibid., 13

facing the nation-state and the decisions are made by a cost-benefit form of calculus and are used to maximize national interest.

According to Allison's second model, "Organizational Process":

"Governments define alternatives and estimate consequences as their component organizations process information; governments act as these organization enact routines. Governmental behavior can therefore be understood, according to a second conceptual model, less deliberate choices and more as output of large organizations functioning according to standard pattern of behavior".³

In organizational behavior model, the analyst investigates e.g. the standard operating procedures (SOP) of government organizations in order to understand which policy alternatives are available to political actors and which one is chosen and why. So, the organizational behavior paradigm closes the gaps of the rational actor paradigm. Organizations look at the policy output and are constrained by organizational routines. Thousands of government organizations are involved in decision making process and the problems are delegated to organizations and the power is diffused. Therefore where organizations are concerned the Standard Operating Procedures dictate the course of action.

Finally, for the "governmental politics model" Allison states that

"The decisions and actions of governments are international political resultants: resultants in the sense that what happens is not chosen as a solution to a problem but rather results from compromise, conflict and confusion and the activity from which decisions emerge is best characterized as bargaining among individual members of the government".⁴

This model conceives of governmental policy under question not as a rational actor choice or organizational output but as a "resultant" of bargaining

³ Ibid., 67

⁴ Ibid., 162

along regular circuits among players positioned hierarchically within the government. In this model, the political actors and their intentions, positions and interests, their relative power, the action channels through which the political actors input and exert their influence, decision rules and similar matters stand to the fore in analysis. According to Allison the three models are complementary to each other. Allison states,

“For explaining actions where national security interests dominate, shared values lead to a consensus on what national security requires, Model 1 is useful. For explaining specific characteristics of a governmental action performed by a large organization, Model II is the most powerful. Decisions that emerge from intra-governmental debate at the highest levels are the stuff of Model III”.⁵

According to the bureaucratic politics model policy decisions are not made by rational choice nor by a unitary actor, rather are policy decisions determined by an activity of give and take between organizational units which can best be described as a process of bargaining. Allison explains the bureaucratic politics model as individuals in a group who are players bargaining for position and power. As a result government interaction can be understood as a bargaining game, with the outcomes resulting from competition. Bureaucratic politics sees no unitary actors but many actors who focus not on a single issue but a variety of issues. Therefore, rather than giving different answers to the same question, each of the three models illuminates one corner of the issue and contributes to our understanding. By integrating the factors identified under each lens, Allison argues, explanations can be significantly strengthened. Many authors have reviewed Allison’s three models and for the purpose of my research I have

⁵ Ibid., 276.

reviewed their literature in order to gain a greater understanding of the utility of these models.

Bendor and Hammond have reviewed Allison's models and they provide a thorough analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of each of his three models. The rational actor, labeled Model I, is simple while, governmental politics, Model III is extremely complex. Bendor and Hammond believe that a good model must strike a balance between simplicity and complexity. They propose a typology of policymaking that includes three primary dimensions: number of decision makers, rationality of decision makers and availability of adequate information (complete versus incomplete) for decision-making. Their matrix gives 12 separate policymaking types as compared to Allison's three models.⁶ Overall, they argue that in a bureaucratic politics model of decision-making, bargaining occurs along regularized channels among a multiplicity of players positioned hierarchically within the government, and these players bargain for a variety of national, organizational and personal goals. Organizational decentralization, slack, or discretion, permits players the freedom to negotiate, and it is this political process of bargaining and compromise that produces policy outcomes.

In contrast, Stern and Verbeek regarded the old bureaucratic paradigm to be partly rooted in "public choice". According to them, both of Allison's Model 1 (Rational Actor) and Model III (Bureaucratic Politics) can be construed as public choice models. One interesting conclusion that has been drawn from this public choice approach is that "the bargaining between such multiple rational actors

⁶ Bendor Jonathan and Hammond Thomas, "Rethinking Allison's Models", *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 86, No. 2 (June 1992); 301-322.

may produce an outcome that represents no actor's individual preference which overall suggests that individuals bargain on behalf of, and in the interest of, their organizations in order to mobilize their support. Bargainers are consequently less concerned with the overall issue than the impact it has on their goals because bargaining does not occur in an open space, but within specified and situationally determined channels. Above all, personality and less tangible factors that determine bargaining performance matter.⁷

The most widely criticized model remains model III of Bureaucratic Politics. Art developed a criticism in his three propositions of "bureaucratic politics" which state that the political stance is determined by organizational position. A foreign policy decision once analyzed is the result of pulling and hauling among political participants and is not intent of one person. He also reasserts that implementation of any policy can be affected by organizational routine, standard operating procedures and vested interests.⁸

Art's criticism comes from the fact that Allison fails to give us any measure to what extent "Governmental or Bureaucratic Politics" actually influence Presidential choice. Art's first two propositions deal with policy formulation however in his third he turns to policy implementation. Therefore, Art asserts that "Bureaucratic politics" does not explain the formulation of policy.

Kozak and Keagle contend that the relationship between politics and administration in the early twentieth century was depicted as policy-making being

⁷ Stern, Eric and Verbeek, Bertjan, "Towards a Neo-Pluralist Approach to Bureau-Governmental Politics", *Mershon International Studies Review*, Vol. 42; Supplement 2 (Nov.1998); pg:240-246

⁸ Art, Robert J., "Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A Critique", *Policy Sciences*, 4 (1973);467-490

the realm of the elected officials. The mechanical execution of determined policy was the realm of the professional public servant. Following World War II, scholars began to develop skepticism about the politics/administration relationship. Many scholars and administrators felt that the reality of public administration was not well served by a model that separated politics from administration. From that line of questioning a model was developed that emphasized the political roles and relationships of bureaucracies, agencies and departments and those who manage them.⁹

The current day expert and student of the bureaucratic politics model, Peters provides an interesting approach to the study of bureaucratic government. Peters approached the study of bureaucratic politics by asking what is required by a group of actors in politics to effectively govern a country. In his study, Peters assesses each of the criteria separately to determine the role of bureaucracy in governance. The conclusions that Peters draws from his study are applicable here. Peters concludes that there is, to some degree, leadership in the policy process being provided by the bureaucracy. In modern industrial societies, governing parties do not possess the necessary skills for managing a nation. As a result they must turn to and rely on the machinery of bureaucracy for the missing or weak criteria. Increasingly the overload of government is being passed on to become the overload of the bureaucracy. As an outcome bureaucracies are faced with many of the same roadblocks in policy

⁹ Kozak, D and J. Keagle eds. *Bureaucratic Politics and National Security: Theory and Practice*; Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1988.

development as government. Those include the need to answer to citizens, clientele groups, and the survival of the organization. Thus bureaucracy, Peters concludes, does supply some government, but unlike political parties, the government provided by bureaucracies is non consensual and directed by the bureaucracies' relationship with various clientele groups. The bureaucratic politics model, whether one is inclined to see it in a positive or negative perspective, has both good and bad attributes.¹⁰

One interesting criticism of Bureaucratic Politics comes from Krasner. His critique is stronger than other scholars because he maintains that Allison inappropriately gives too much influence to actors other than the President whereas in fact the President is far stronger than other foreign policy players. His argument basically rests in the fact that the whole Bureaucratic Politics paradigm shifts the blame from the leader or "the President" to the bureaucratic machinery and relieves him of his responsibility. He has analyzed Allison's explanation of the Cuban Missile Crises where Allison states that President Kennedy's decision came as a result of different bureaucratic channels involved and that such a choice would have remained a fore-gone conclusion regardless of whosoever had been in place of Kennedy.

Krasner finds difficulty in accepting this and states that it is not fair to put all the blame on the bureaucratic machinery relieving the Presidential office of his responsibilities. According to Krasner the office of the President brings along with it certain values and cultures which are a part and parcel of any decisions that

¹⁰ Peters, G. *The Politics of Bureaucracy*, 3rd ed. New York: Longman Inc., 1989.

are taken therefore, he refutes Allison's claim of Kennedy's decision during the Cuban Missile Crises resulting from a push by the bureaucratic machinery.¹¹

In order to put Allison's Model III to test, Rhodes conducted a case study of U.S Navy. The study focused primarily on the policy area including navy budgets, procurement and force mix issues and tested the "pulling and hauling" effect of bureaucratic politics as is widely believed to be the case by many scholars. His intention was to test whether the outcomes of these policies were influenced by the bureaucratic positions or were they simply natural outcomes as they should have been in any policy issue. His conclusion was however contrary to the literature available on Bureaucratic Politics and he stated that regardless of the Bureaucratic Politics, the outcomes were not influenced by interests of bureaucracy and was not also affected by bureaucratic power distribution. U.S Navy made a very interesting case study because in determining how influential bureaucratic politics was, Rhodes attempted to go into greater details of budgeting, what kind of carriers Navy needed and allocation of resources for performing effective functioning of the overall organization, these issues were very important to be looked at to determine the outcomes. In his analysis of naval ship building between 1950 and 1990, Rhodes found that the role of the navy's "service unions" was insignificant in influencing the ship construction budget of the United States Navy. According to him, there was no statistically significant difference between the parochial loyalties of the navy's Chief of Naval Operations

¹¹ Krasner Stephen, "Are Bureaucracies Important? (Or Allison Wonderland)", *Foreign Policy*, 7 (Summer 1972) 12.

(CNO) between 1950 and 1990. Rhodes concluded that the importance that is given to Bureaucratic Politics in shaping and influencing policies is not what should be due. Instead he believes that different “ideas” could result in a policy outcome and provide a better explanation than Bureaucratic Politics, which is overly rated and generalized.¹²

Valenta in his research has applied Allison’s bureaucratic politics paradigm to explain Soviet management of Czechoslovak crises of 1968. The methodology of using the Bureaucratic Politics approach by Valenta reflects “division of labor” which the Soviet Politburo members share in various policy areas.¹³ According to Valenta this division of labor is a result of two conditions:

“(i) a highly bureaucratic political system and (ii) a collective leadership in which no single decision maker possesses either sufficient power or sufficient wisdom to decide all important policy matter”. (pg57)

It is important to understand the Politburo because the determinant of Soviet foreign policy does not lie with a unitary actor instead it is a resultant of political interaction (pulling and hauling) among senior decision makers. Valenta believes that the images of national security are very strongly debated in the inner circles of the Soviet decisions making machinery however the approach taken in resolving issues might differ. In case of the Czechoslovak crises of 1968, the stand taken by senior Soviet decision makers differed in the time of the crises for some believed that military solution to the crises was the best way to end Czech reformism and the foreign policy decision makers believed an

¹² Rhodes E., “Do Bureaucratic Politics Matter” *World Politics* 47, 1994;1-41

¹³ Valenta, Jiri, “The Bureaucratic Politics Paradigm and the Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia,” *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 94, 1 (spring 1979).

intervention to be too costly at that time. Valenta concludes that the decision to intervene in Czechoslovakia and opting for the military outcome was based on

“bureaucratic interests and perspectives of senior decision makers, manipulated information, East European political instability and pressures, intergovernmental games in Czechoslovakia, signals of U.S noninvolvement and shaky compromises among elements in politburo” (pg.75)

Finally his study shows that the Bureaucratic Politics Paradigm substantially illuminates many aspects of decision making focusing on the dynamics of the role played by the bureaucracies.

Many scholars have reviewed the Bureaucratic Politics Model from a public policy perspective and it is important to look at that aspect as well. Kaarbo is one such scholar who conducted a study, which is primarily an investigation of the role of junior coalition partners in Israeli and German foreign policy. Through an analysis of case studies, Kaarbo has assessed the characteristics of parliamentary systems and politics of coalition and the role they play in foreign policy. Through a case study approach she selected eight cases to investigate the role of junior coalition partners in Israeli and German foreign policy. The conclusions she came up with stated that intense coalition conflict existed over important foreign policy issues between the competitive political parties sharing government power and resources. Her research provides a challenge for foreign policy analysts who claim that dominant actors always prevail. Because according to Kaarbo, non-dominant actors (in her selected case studies) like the

junior coalition partners in the cabinet, which are considered as “minorities in the cabinet”, have influenced foreign policy decision-making.¹⁴

Another interesting study in the realm of public policy explaining the structure of Bureaucratic Politics comes from Rourke. In *Bureaucracy, Politics, and Public Policy*, Rourke provides scholars with a conceptual framework for analyzing the bureaucratic policy process based on two independent variables, expertise and constituency support, plus two intervening variables, leadership and organizational vitality. Rourke contends that all organizations, even those that perform simple routinized tasks, possess some degree of expertise and political prowess. He further states that Bureaucratic expertise is manifest in two important ways: firstly through the ability to collect and control information, and secondly through the types of professionals that dominate an agency.

Political support, on the other hand, is most often derived from the clients an agency serves or important legislative and executive constituencies (Chap.3). While all agencies possess expertise and political support, organizational vitality and leadership, the intervening variables differentiate powerful and weak agencies. He also states that Agency success is also associated with strong leaders who possess the ability to mobilize political support and to capitalize on their agency's expertise (Chap. 4). I found that most interestingly, Rourke explains bureaucratic behavior in terms of the quest for more money, more people, more responsibility, and less accountability. These uses of the concept of power lead to the conclusion that it is the end of bureaucratic behavior, that the

¹⁴ Kaarbo, Juliet (1996) “Power and Influence in Foreign Policy Decision Making: The Role of Junior Coalition Partners in German and Israeli Foreign Policy”, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol.40:501-530

more power an agency can acquire, the more operational and managerial freedom it will have.¹⁵

Brower and Abolafia in their ethnographic research study have used four key elements from Allison's Model III to explain the view of bureaucratic politics from those that are at the bottom of the hierarchical structure in bureaucracy. These four elements are channels, positions, players, and preferences. In order to complete the structure the activities of bureaucratic politics, they have added Allison's "rules of the game" to their analysis. According to the authors, the politics that takes place in the bureaucracy from middle to top is different from the politics that goes on from middle to bottom. This makes bureaucratic politics a "bargaining game". One interesting result of their study comes from the fact that in lower levels of bureaucracy, the actors do not have the authority to influence the policies therefore the elements of "individual identity, self-esteem, and career become the stakes for political action".

The authors in their conclusion state that the actors that are at work from below lack the position to influence policies, but this does not mean that they do not engage in bureaucratic politics at all. They do and since they are unable to use the regular available channels therefore, they use alternative channels to participate in politics. I would agree with the authors that from the top, the main goal is to bargain for a desired governmental outcome and from below it boils down to selfhood and identity. Thus, when we talk about Bureaucratic Politics, it

¹⁵ Rourke, F. E. (1984). *Bureaucracy, politics, and public policy* (3rd ed.). Boston: Little, Brown and Company

is important to analyze all those unseen factors that are involved in shaping the outcomes of any policy.¹⁶

From the Public Administration perspective, Paul 'T Hart and Uriel Rosenthal in their research "Reappraising Bureaucratic Politics" have dealt with three issues concerning the Bureaucratic Politics. Their research is very interesting because after reviewing the three issues, they have left the grounds open for International Relations scholars to import some of the conclusions and utilize it in their researches. According to the authors, IR scholars have not included in their research of Bureaucratic Politics any new dimensions than those that were provided by Allison in 1971. The three issues deal with topics relating with using the Bureaucratic Politics model as a "catch all" theory, four perspectives about Bureaucratic Politics and lastly considering Bureaucratic Politics to be a good or bad thing. Firstly, the authors find the whole bureaucratic politics model to be "superfluous". They believe that Bureaucratic Politics model fails to take into account the relationship politicians share with other stakeholders in the policy networks. This model remains so much ingrained in the political infighting that takes between the political bureaucrats that it loses its focus in explaining the relationship between the politicians and bureaucratic advisors that also includes military elites.¹⁷

The authors also criticize the previous research that has been done for better understanding of Bureaucratic Politics Model. The question that they have

¹⁶ Brower Ralph S and Abolafia Mitchel Y, " Bureaucratic politics: the view from below", *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* , Vol.7 No.2 (April 1997); 305

¹⁷ 'T Hart Paul and Rosenthal Uriel, "Reappraising Bureaucratic Politics", *Mershon International Studies Review*. Vol. 42; 2 (Nov.1998); 233-240

posed is as to why Bureaucratic Politics is taken as a dependent variable to explain the policy outcomes? The authors contend that the bureaucratic division of labor that exists between the executive branches is responsible for bureaucratic politics and is a resultant of the rivalries between bureaus. 'T Hart and Rosenthal have done a great deal of research providing a different perspective to the entire debate that surrounds Bureaucratic politics both in Public Administration circles and that too in the foreign policy analysis. They have stated that the need is to look beyond the obvious bureaucratic politics set up and come up with more explanations regarding inter and intra governmental politics that forms a bigger part of the whole structure of Bureaucratic Politics.

After reviewing the existing literature I find it difficult to actually state whether various authors have justified their criticism of Allison's models rightly or not because each has done so trying to apply Allison in different situations. Overall, I conclude that this past research and critique of Allison suggests that no one model in its entirety can be used to explain national decision making. The Rational Actor Model is as important as the Bureaucratic Politics Model and where emphasis is given on different foreign policy participants the role a President plays as a unitary actor can also not be ignored therefore these three models together best explain any decision taken. From the formulation of a policy till its implementation the standard operation procedures of an organization can also not be disregarded because the organizational process forms the basis for bureaucratic politics thus giving shape and outcome to the governmental decisions. The usefulness of Allison's models depends on the situation or crises

one intends to explain. But overall there have been more criticisms of his models, especially the bureaucratic politics model in providing a ground base for explaining national decision making.

METHODOLOGY:

This thesis is based on a single case study and will test Graham Allison's three models for national decision making. I will be testing all the three models separately to find out as to which model (if any) best explains as to what were the intentions of Pakistan when it went nuclear in 1998. The data that is available to me for this thesis is basically drawn from journalistic records and I will be making use of these records as the sole sources available to conduct this research.

I believe that testing the validity of the bureaucratic politics model (Model III) presents some special problems, especially in a parliamentary system like that of Pakistan (especially when we do a case study of Pakistani politics in 1998). Cabinet solidarity and secrecy will make it difficult for me to empirically measure the level of debate and compromise that took place within the inner circle of government. The condition of non-partisanship adhered to by bureaucrats made any public record from a senior bureaucrat suspect to questions of neutrality or ruling party doctrine. Finally, the debate that occurred at the intra-departmental level occurred behind closed doors during the course of the working day and was not susceptible to public debate and scrutiny. This presents a methodological challenge to this study. However, with a comprehensive review of journalistic materials available, many of the problems will be overcome.

CHAPTER II

MODEL I: RATIONAL ACTOR MODEL

I will provide additional elaboration of Allison's Rational Actor Model before applying it in case of Pakistan. Following are the basic concepts that make up RAM

- “(i) Goals and Objectives
- (ii) Alternatives
- (iii) Consequences and
- (iv) Choice”.¹⁸

According to Allison, in any foreign policy decision or national decision making, an agent at the outset of his decision ranks all possible sets of consequences according to his goals and objectives, and then he chooses from a possible set of alternatives in the light of those objectives. Every alternative bears different sets of consequences and different assumptions are derived from each alternative. Lastly, Allison suggests that a “rational choice” is made by the decision maker when he selects the best possible alternative as his course of action which maximizes the gains of his decision and minimizes the costs.

The basic unit of analysis in Rational Actor paradigm is governmental action as a “rational choice.” Allison states that the rational actor selects the action that will maximize strategic goals and objectives. Allison has based his Model I on a number of assumptions in which action is a form of behavior that reflects intention or purpose. The assumption is that actor is a national government and the act chosen is a calculated solution to a strategic problem. All these assumptions lead to a coherent set of details which explain as to what goal

¹⁸ Allison; pp.29-30

was perceived by the government when it acted and how that action was a reasonable choice keeping in mind the nation's objectives.

He states that

“The rational action maintains that a rational choice consists of value-maximizing adaptation within the context of a given payoff function, fixed alternatives and consequences that are known.”¹⁹

According to Allison, the actor (government) is a rational, unitary decision maker. The actor has one set of specified goals, one set of perceived options, and a single estimate of the consequences that follow from each alternative. Allison identifies the problem as action chosen in response to a specific problem. The action is a steady state choice as perceived by Allison, among alternatives rather than a large number of partial choices in a dynamic stream of events. The Rational Actor model therefore has a unitary (or group) decision maker who is able to state objectives, state preferences among objectives, generate alternative courses of action, assess the consequences of every alternative action of each objective and select the best alternative. Unlike the two other models (which are merely descriptive) this model is normative, that is decision makers should make decisions in accordance with these principles.²⁰ I will now apply this model to the case of Pakistan's detonation in 1998.

In understanding how RAM can be applied to the case of Pakistan's detonation, I will follow the four basic principles as proposed by Allison that lead towards a rational choice.

¹⁹Ibid.,31

²⁰ Ibid.,33

(i) Goals and Objectives:

Like all strategic goals are achieved in the light of goals and objectives of the decision maker therefore, the most primary objective for Pakistan after Indian nuclear tests was to safeguard her national security. Pakistan's national security was threatened when India conducted the tests in Pokhran, because it signaled a dramatic shift in India's nuclear posture. India repeatedly emphasized that the tests were not directed at any country but were meant to provide a credible option to counter the geo-strategic threats in the region. The Indian foreign office also released statements that sought to explain the Indian point of view to China and to plead for friendly cooperation moreover these tests conducted by India were said to be Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE).²¹ But given the hostility between the two nations; Pakistan disregarded Indian statements of a peaceful nuclear program and centered their arguments on a grand hegemonic design that India had all along for South Asia which was realized by her nuclear testing. Therefore, whatever decision Pakistan was to take was to revolve around her strategic goals and objectives which ultimately go no further than India being a threatening neighbor.

(ii) Alternatives

Analyzing the options available to Pakistan is the next step in applying the Rational Actor Model. Pakistan had been under pressure from across the political spectrum to explode a nuclear device of its own since India carried out its five

²¹ http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/asia/jan-june98/india_5-12.html

tests on May 11 and May 13. Therefore there were only three options available to Pakistan

(a) Do nothing

(b) Turn to international community and condemn the testing or

(c) Respond in kind to maintain the nuclear balance of power in the region

without which the most affected state would have been Pakistan.

Any wrong choice at that time would have resulted in a chaos and lifetime regret, therefore it was ultimate for Pakistan's survival to make the right choice. The choice of doing nothing bore consequences and so did the rest of the two options available. But besides these three alternatives there was no fourth means available of avoiding this whole ordeal when national security was threatened. Especially when one considers the whole time frame which does not span more than 20 days from the time India detonated and Pakistan responded, it is interesting to note whether there could have been more options available or not. As short as the time was for any of Pakistan's action to be credible, it leaves little choice for analysis that the whole decision was based on very limited options available to Pakistan.

(iii) Consequences

All the above mentioned three options bear different consequences with merits and demerits. I will elaborate these options in greater detail, presenting a cost-benefit analysis in each given case.

-First Choice: Do Nothing:

The first option always in any given case is to do nothing, so this was true for Pakistan as well. After India had carried out successful nuclear tests, the choice left for Pakistan was simply to accept it and also accept the nuclear status it brought to India. Like any other situation this option had its pros and cons as well. Had Pakistan chosen this option, the world would have regarded Pakistan as a stable nation who despite being grossly vulnerable to an Indian action like detonation, kept its cool and refrained from following in India's footsteps. And as two wrongs do not make one right, Pakistan's response would have made the things worse. This option had two flaws.

Firstly, if Pakistan had decided on doing nothing, it would have reiterated Indian suspicions that Pakistan is a weak state, fearful of Indian hegemony in South Asia and that Pakistan does not bear a capability to respond which gives India a free hand to do whatever she might please to disturb the strategic balance of power in the region.

Secondly, if Pakistan had decided not to respond at that time then there was nothing Pakistan could have done later to have countered the threats and insecurity that would have become multifold after Indian nuclear tests and Pakistan would have lost her credibility for good. The threat posed by the Indian tests was very grave to national security of Pakistan. The Indians detonated five nuclear bombs and these bombs developed, gave them the ability to develop various kinds of weapons, ranging from a hydrogen bomb, which is a thermonuclear or a fusion bomb, to a missile warhead, nuclear missile warhead,

and artillery, nuclear artillery shells that can be used in a tactical situation. So this is a wide range of weaponry that the Indians were moving to acquire and put in their arsenal.²² They already had tremendous conventional weapons superiority over Pakistan. This was a blow to the stability in South Asia, and this was a fatal blow to the international non-proliferation regime. So all these considered, Pakistan was dealing with a country that in terms of nuclear proliferation was a rogue state. Pakistan had to deal with India with strength. Therefore, it would have been suicidal for Pakistan to do nothing. This option falls short for its merits which only bring respect to Pakistan in the eyes of the world, but fail to provide any security assurance in the wake of any future confrontation with nuclear India after which Pakistan would only have the option to annihilate and perhaps not even that. This led to consideration for the second option.

-Second Option: Turn to International Community:

Availing this option also had its merits and demerits. The International community very strongly condemned India for conducting her nuclear tests and at the same time urged Pakistan to refrain from testing her nuclear capability. The Indian tests drew immediate condemnation from the Clinton administration, who said the United States was "deeply disappointed" and was reviewing trade and financial sanctions against India under American non-proliferation laws. The other Western nations, including Britain, which voiced its "dismay"; Germany, which called the tests "a slap in the face" for 149 countries that have signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; and Kofi Annan, the U.N. Secretary-General,

²² Tellis Ashley J, *India's Emerging Nuclear Posture: Between Recessed Deterrent and Ready Arsenal*. New Delhi, OUP, 2001.

who issued a statement expressing his "deep regret." All condemned India and urged Pakistan to exercise self-restraint at all possible costs.²³ This stopped Pakistan from appealing before the International community because regardless of the condemnation of the tests by International community the situation could not have been reversed. India's nuclear status was there to stay and be a source of insecurity for Pakistan for all times to come and the international community could not have provided Pakistan with any solace from the fact that the "power" India attained with going nuclear was proving destabilizing for Pakistan. There were no merits in sight in choosing this option because India had been defiant of the United Nations resolutions in the past where the Kashmir dispute was concerned and this for Pakistan was a very major blow. Thus, keeping the inefficiency of UN in mind and its failure to curb the tensions between Pakistan and India, Pakistan felt useless turning to International community for help. Besides the United Nations, the United States had also deplored India's nuclear testing and knew that a response in kind would blow the disarmament policies the US maintains world wide. This was a very confusing time for Pakistan because turning to the international community would mean that Pakistan was open for any peaceful arrangements the community would have offered in lure for Pakistan not testing her nukes. This would have bound Pakistan to go only one way and would not have left any other possibilities open later on if the situation for Pakistan was to become precarious. Had the international

²³ Burns John F., "India Carries Out Nuclear Tests in Defiance of International Treaty," *New York Times*, May 12, 1998;pg.1
<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F20716F93D540C718DDDAC0894D0494D81>

community including the United Nations, been effective enough to urge India to disarm, then this option would have held its grounds, but at that time it did not seem attractive enough to stop Pakistan from considering the third option.

-Third Option: Respond in Kind:

The third option available to Pakistan was to respond in kind to Indian nuclear tests. Going nuclear and following Indian footsteps was however a much more attractive way for Pakistan because this would deny India the unilateral technical advantage it might have gained from conducting tests; secondly, this option would have restored a sense of a balance-of-power with India in her own eyes, India's, the rest of the world's and as stated earlier for maintaining her own national security which was threatened in the wake of Indian tests. Finally it would provide a chance for Pakistan to test her own nuclear capability and show the world that through nuclear power it could match India.

The demerits of this option were however much more disastrous than the merits. If Pakistan decided to go nuclear then it was to face International military, nuclear and economic sanctions with immediate effect. These sanctions, if imposed in the wake of any nuclear detonation, would potentially destroy Pakistan's economy which was already in shambles and under billion dollar debts owed to International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Availing this option also meant that no further loans were to be given to Pakistan to continue with developmental projects and economic stability thus crippling the economy once and for all. Pakistan knew fully well that the sanctions would hurt Pakistan more than India. The international community already very strongly

urged Pakistan not to detonate and had been reaffirming the after effects to Pakistan since the time India detonated. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and General Anthony Zinni visited Pakistan after the Indian nuclear tests and personally warned Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif about the consequences that would follow if Pakistan considered responding in kind. The list of possibilities offered to Pakistan was very attractive as it held the promise of waiver from the Pressler Amendment, delivery of F-16's for which Pakistan had already paid and a possibility of debt waivers.²⁴ But this would all remain a dream and much more restrictions would be inflicted if Pakistan decides not to listen. Considering the merits of not going nuclear and showing self-restraint as a responsible country was much more lucrative with offers for economic prosperity than going nuclear and losing it all. Not only losing it all, but also plunging into deeper economic crises with increased debt burden. Therefore, the list of demerits for this option was much more lethal in economic terms and less attractive than the merit which only would have been coming at power with India in nuclear capability and satisfying ego as far as matching head to head with India was concerned. There also was a lot of internal pressure on Pakistan to respond to Indian nuclear tests. These internal pressures were stronger than the external ones and thus outbalanced all international restraint suggestions.

(iv) Choice

After weighing these three options it was amazing that the pressure for testing still spanned the political spectrum from liberals like opposition leader

²⁴ Zarah Farah, "Will Pakistan Test? The view from Islamabad", *Global Beat*, Issue Brief No.35. May 19, 1998

Benazir Bhutto to the religious right. Bhutto reportedly went so far as to declare that "if there is military capability to eliminate India's nuclear capacity, it should be used."²⁵ Out of the three alternatives lined up, Pakistan chose the third option, to detonate as a choice to deal with the crises. The most interesting fact remains that this third option available to Pakistan was the one with the most detrimental effects for Pakistan's future therefore it remains the most unpredictable choice keeping in mind the aspect of rationality. According to the rational actor paradigm following is the general principal of a "value-maximizing" behavior as stated by Allison

"the likelihood of any particular action results from a combination of the nation's (i) relevant values and objectives (ii) perceived alternative course of action (iii) estimates of various sets of consequences and (iv) net valuation of each set of consequences."²⁶

All these four principles must be followed if a unitary decision maker has to make a rational choice. A choice according to Allison would be rational only if all the alternatives are perceived and options carefully weighed with carefully analyzed consequences for each set of action opted. If this is applied in all sincerity of the logic that surrounds this statement then it is very difficult to say that Pakistan's choice was rational by any means.

Rational Actor Model and Pakistan's Detonation:

In applying Allison's Rational Actor Model, the cost benefit analysis would become clearer if the Indian response to Pakistan weighing its options is also taken into consideration. Since India has remained central to any decision

²⁵ Benazir Bhutto, *Daily Jang Newspaper*, May 13, 1998;pg.1

²⁶ Allison;pg.34

making in Pakistan since its inception in 1947, therefore it is not wise to rule out that Indian reaction was not considered while analyzing the choices and their consequences. Although, there exists no official reference to support that possible Indian reactions were analyzed in each case. Indian Reaction to

- a) **Do Nothing:** If Pakistan decided to do nothing in the wake of Indian testing; it would have strengthened Indian position where ultimate military superiority in the region is concerned. It would have been in Indian interests if Pakistan had chosen this option because in choosing to do nothing, Pakistan was to lose its credibility that it possessed nuclear capability and secondly, keeping in mind the animosity between these two countries, India would also have had a psychological superiority over Pakistan. Pakistan might have lived with Indian nuclear superiority, but I believe the psychological victory would have been unbearable. This is also suggested by the overwhelming public pressure the Pakistani government was subjected to after the Indian tests.²⁷ Therefore, I believe that this option was not the most suitable one for Pakistan because it clearly gave India the winning edge which was unacceptable.
- b) **Turn to international community:** Turning to the international community would have provoked a severe Indian reaction because all along India had been claiming that the United States possessed a “soft spot” for Pakistan. India also had been blaming China for providing clandestine help to Pakistan for nurturing its nuclear program. Choosing this option would

²⁷ http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/asia/jan-june98/nuclear_5-29.html

definitely have provided Pakistan with economic benefits but an unpredictable Indian reaction. Choosing this option would have created an Indian uproar of “favoring” Pakistan which might have destabilized the situation or help India in furthering its already aggressive stance towards Pakistan.

- c) **Respond in kind:** The last option of responding in kind had the proclivity of propagating a negative Indian reaction as well. If Pakistan chose to reply by her own nuclear testing then India would have taken a stance of aggravating the arms race in the region. Secondly, in the wake of such an action, India would consider building up her nuclear machinery which was not so much a threat as was of her deploying those missiles facing towards Pakistan. But the benefit of such an action would have given Pakistan a minimal deterrence against any Indian aggressive posture.

All the three options with the exception of “doing nothing” possessed negative connotations if considered from an Indian point of view. But “doing nothing” as a reaction to Indian nuclear tests bore huge psychological costs for Pakistan which outweighed the benefits (economic only).

Rapid Pakistani Response:

The time frame within which Pakistan responded to Indian attacks is not more than 20 days. It is interesting to note that in those 20 days, all the options were analyzed (perhaps), delivery vehicles were mobilized (definitely) and the test site was prepared (absolutely). The question as to why Pakistan responded so rapidly (with the third option of responding in kind) is a very significant one at

this stage because it refutes the claim of the Rational Actor Model which states that the action chosen is a rational action which maximizes the benefits and reduces the costs for the actor. The reason Pakistan responded so quickly is because that Pakistani intelligence sources suspected India for having planned an attack on her nuclear installations. This intelligence report was the basis on which the Indian High Commissioner (stationed in Pakistan) was summoned by the Foreign Minister and was asked for an explanation at 1:00 a.m on May 27, 1998. These claims however were rejected by the Indian High Commissioner.²⁸ The next day, as the world witnessed, Pakistan detonated five nuclear devices. This could only mean one of the two things. Either Pakistan was trying to have an excuse in the name of “the so called intelligence reports” that helped expedite the testing or Pakistan was building a face saving situation for the world to know that due to heightened insecurity (and in the name of protecting her national interests) the nuclear testing was inevitable.

Costs and benefits of pursuing a Nuclear Policy:

The political victory of BJP in March 1998 clearly signaled a nuclear moratorium for pursuing of nuclear policy. A number of times during the political campaigns and even after forming the government, BJP maintained that a nuclear India was necessary to counter the threats posed by her aggressive neighbors including Pakistan as well as China.²⁹ As mentioned several times by the Pakistani officials, that the real threat for Pakistan emanated from Indian hegemonic ambitions in the region and pushed Pakistan into pursuing a nuclear

²⁸ <http://www.rediff.com/news/1998/may/28bomb3.htm>

²⁹ <http://www.indianembassy.org/pic/nuclear/briefonnucleartests.htm>

policy.³⁰ Therefore, regardless of provocation by the Indian tests of 1998, Pakistan's nuclear tests were inevitable. Reason being India's possession of nuclear capability as was demonstrated in 1974. Pakistan's testing of nuclear bombs gave her military a gauging stability against the huge Indian conventional capability. Although, Pakistan's testing provided Pakistan only with a minimal deterrence but it did stabilize the balance of power in the region.

Nuclear detonation by Pakistan though shattered all economic stabilization hopes but provided Pakistan with a strong military edge in comparison with India, which Pakistan weighed as more important at that time than any economic benefits in the wake of not testing and responding in kind. Therefore, pursuing a nuclear policy definitely was in Pakistan's favor rather than pursuing her economic agenda keeping in mind the delicacy of situation that existed between India and Pakistan in 1998. Not responding in kind would have involved Pakistan in an arms race, which would have borne huge economic costs in the long run. Thus, I believe that Pakistan's option to go nuclear helped control the arms race in the region which would have proven destabilizing in the absence of such a response.

Following is the scenario when applied in case of Pakistan:

1. *Basic Unit of Analysis: Governmental action as a choice:* Pakistan selected an action that maximized her strategic goals and objectives.
2. *Organizing Concepts:*

³⁰ <http://www.fas.org/news/pakistan/1998/05/980531-app.htm>

- (a) *National Actor*: Pakistani nation, Pakistani government conceived as a rational unitary decision maker is the agent.
- (b) *The Problem*: The threats that appeared after the Indian nuclear testing drove the actor (Pakistan) to act in the manner it did.
- (c) *Static Selection*: Among various alternatives available to Pakistan, the action taken to detonate was conceived as the solution.
- (d) *Action as a rational choice*: Now according to Allison there are four components that constitute a rational choice:
- (i) *Goals and Objectives*: Pakistan decided to detonate keeping in mind the national security and national interests as her primary goal and objective.
 - (ii) *Options*: After carefully weighing all the options available, Pakistan chose the best suitable one.
 - (iii) *Consequences*: Pakistan was very well aware of the consequences that would follow if the decision to detonate was taken and acted keeping in mind the costs and benefits of those consequences.
 - (iv) *Choice*: According to Allison, rational choice is value-maximizing. Pakistan's decision to test its nuclear bombs was the most suitable choice whose consequences ranked highest in terms of her goals and objectives.

3. *Dominant Inference Pattern*: If Pakistan chose to detonate then according to inference pattern, it must have ends towards which this action must have constituted a maximizing means.

4. *General Propositions*: According to Allison a rational action is the one which is less consequential and possesses great value but in this case Allison's predictions fall short.

Allison's RAM provides us with two propositions.

- (i) "An increase in the costs of an alternative reduces the likelihood of that action being chosen.
- (ii) A decrease in the costs of an alternative increases the likelihood of that action being chosen."³¹

If we keep these two propositions in mind then applying RAM to the case of Pakistan's detonation will have serious problems in explanation. The first proposition suggests that in a cost benefit analysis, if the costs raise high for an option then that action will not be chosen thus will not become a rational choice. In case of Pakistan however, it was just the opposite. The option to respond in kind had huge consequences for Pakistan and according to RAM it should not have been chosen as an action rather an alternative would have been preferable. But, Pakistan's decision to detonate and choosing this as the ultimate choice defies Allison's first proposition.

Secondly, if we apply the second proposition then the choice for Pakistan should have been either to do nothing or turn to the international community because their merits put together provide a decrease in cost and either way

³¹ Ibid.,34

would have proved to be less detrimental than the action actually chosen. If Pakistan had chosen the first option of doing nothing as a response, it would have gained her respect as a stable nation in the eyes of the International community and gained her their support in the wake of any crises with India. Similarly, turning to the International community would have helped in attaining deterrence of some sort either in the form of International defense agreements to strengthen Pakistan's conventional capabilities or the sanctions on India would have provided some solace to Pakistan. But instead of all these merits that could have decreased the "costs" of action Allison proposes, Pakistan decided to choose an option which had the most severe consequences and the most "costly" action ever for futures to come. Therefore, rational actor was Pakistan but the action being the decision to detonate, was not rational which goes against to the Rational Actor Model's principles.

Conclusion:

Going back to the basics of Rational Actor Model that dominate this paradigm, Pakistan had an objective, Pakistan stated preferences among objectives, Pakistan generated possible alternative courses of action, Pakistan assessed the consequences of every alternative action of each objective and Pakistan as a rational actor selected the best alternative (or was it the best?)

Now, if we analyze further whether the first two options of "doing nothing" and "turning to International community" were really considered, then the time span in which the decision was made and the third option "to respond in kind" was finalized, leaves us in ambiguity. Despite the merits and demerits for the first

two options, it is my assumption that they were not thoroughly analyzed by the Pakistani officials. Reason being that any decision in history ever taken by Pakistan at the national and international level has been India-centered. Pakistan has felt insecure since the time of Independence in 1947 and therefore has always paid heavy prices and high costs for her decisions to go to war with India over a period of 55 years. After Indian detonation, this state of insecurity was further heightened.

For the purpose of analysis, following are the statements that were given by Pakistani officials between May 11th and May 31st which help explain the mood since the time of Indian explosions till the time Pakistan detonated and might help explain how difficult it was to select an alternative action which would maximize the gains and minimize the costs.

Khan stated on May 11, 1998 following India's announcement that it had conducted nuclear tests stated that

"Pakistan strongly condemns this Indian act and the entire world should condemn it. It has sucked Pakistan into an arms race."³²

The purpose of this statement was to let the International community know indirectly that if Pakistan responds in kind then it would not be because Pakistan wants so but because India has started an arms race in the region which is unilateral in every aspect.

A statement issued by the Pakistani Defense Committee on May 13, 1998 stated that

"The Indian government had in recent weeks exhibited a pattern of irresponsible behavior and taken deliberate steps to further heighten the tensions in the region."³³

³²Pakistani Foreign Minister, Gohar Ayub Khan, *The News International*, May 12, 1998;pg.1

³³ Report by Pakistan Defense Committee, *The Daily Jang Newspaper*, May 14, 1998;pg.1

Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on May 19, 1998 stated that

"I think we want to show to the world that Pakistan is a responsible country ... It can exercise restraint on itself. If India is doing this out of sheer madness ... we don't want to blindly follow suit."³⁴

This above statement by Nawaz Sharif indicated his backing off from an earlier statement stating that a nuclear test by Pakistan was imminent. Later on a statement was given by Pakistani Foreign Secretary declaring that Pakistan had conducted a sixth nuclear test on May 30, 1998

"Today we proved our credibility; there are no doubts anymore."³⁵

The above mentioned statements by Pakistan's Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif and the Pakistani Foreign Ministry make a very good case to explain as to how Pakistani officials kept oscillating back and forth on the issue of Indian nuclear tests and Pakistan's unpredictable stand on the issue. After analyzing these statements from both the sides it is obvious that it was a very confusing situation for Pakistan especially when India had made it clear that her nuclear program was not Pakistan centered. Pakistani statements reflect the state of heightened insecurity at that time. At first Pakistan condemned and deplored India for her nuclear tests and blamed India for dragging her into the nuclear arms race. Later on the statements followed that Pakistan will avoid following the route India had taken and will not respond in kind. Finally, the statement from Pakistani Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmad on May 30 confirmed that

³⁴ Report on televised address of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on May 19, 1998, *The Daily Jang Newspaper*, May 20, 1998; pg.1. (Report on televised address of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on May 19, 1998)

³⁵ Shamshad Ahmad, *The News International*, May 31, 1998;p.1 (Foreign Ministry Press briefing after the tests)

Pakistan had conducted six successful nuclear tests and has matched Indian nuclear capability.

The analysis of these statements by Pakistani officials suggests that only one thing was guiding the light and that was to safeguard her “national security”. This national security card has been and is always played between India and Pakistan and it was no different in 1998 as well. Thus, we can state that this model does not provide us with sufficient explanation as to why Pakistan exploded its nuclear devices in 1998 rather than opting for alternatives which would have reduced the costs and benefited her in the long run. I say that because firstly, Pakistan (as a rational actor) did not make an exhaustive search for alternatives. One reference to support my claim comes from a statement made by Deputy Chief of Mission; Embassy of Pakistan in the United States stating that Pakistan was already under sanctions from the International community and taking the nuclear route would not make any difference to the economic situation in Pakistan.³⁶ This pre set mentality can also be seen in the earlier quoted remarks from the Foreign Minister of Pakistan as well as from the former Prime Minister Bhutto. Therefore, on the basis of analyzing this hawkish behavior coming from those in position of authority to influence the governmental decision suggests that may be the alternatives existed, the knowledge of their consequences existed but their taking into account and completely analyzing them was overshadowed by the preconceived frame of mind. Secondly, Pakistan ignored information that was inconsistent with her pre-existing beliefs which includes India’s claim that India’s nuclear program was and has never been

³⁶ http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/asia/jan-june98/pakistan_5-26a.html

Pakistan centered. Despite these statements, Pakistan due to the inherent insecurity was bound to believe that India's detonations were the base of India's grand hegemonic design. Third, Pakistan's preference order was not fixed across time and space, meaning that the choice made to detonate was random and momentous with no long term implications in mind and was made under sheer internal pressures which include domestic egoist demands to come to par with India.

Finally, even if we accept for a second that Pakistan made a rational decision, it does not follow that group decision making proceeds in a rational manner because in order to understand Pakistan's decision making the unitary actor model does not suffice as there is an interplay of so many factors which work in the background thus shaping the rationality or irrationality of her decision which one needs to understand before analyzing her as a unitary decision maker. Decision-making in Pakistan does not follow a "unitary" decision-making model. The General Head Quarter (GHQ) headed by the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), possess the authority to either approve or disapprove any decision being made. All the political and foreign policy decisions have to be approved by the COAS in order to be implemented. In sum, there are serious limitations to the Rational Actor Model. After having said this, I would continue to test Allison's Model II, the Organizational Process Model to find explanation to strengthen the case for Pakistan's national decision making.

CHAPTER III

MODEL II: ORGANIZATIONAL PROCESS MODEL

In order to apply the Organizational Process Model, it is important to have an understanding of the process. Allison sees governmental behavior as to be understood not as deliberate choices of individuals but rather as “outputs of large organizations functioning according to standard patterns of behavior.”³⁷ Allison draws upon the organizational theory to build a model of governmental behavior based on multiple actors operating under constraints of bounded rationality and curtailed information. According to Allison there are five characteristic deviations from comprehensive rationality which are

- “1) Factored problems (problems are factored into different parts which are dealt with non- simultaneously)
- 2) Satisficing (decision makers satisfice rather than optimize)
- 3) Search (organizations search using standard processes which limit choices)
- 4) Uncertainty Avoidance (organizations deal with uncertainty by making decisions, then making small corrections, like a thermostat, rather than considering alternatives and making a single binding decision)
- 5) Repertoires (of programs are developed that limit effective choice).”³⁸

Allison elaborates these five factors to strengthen his proposition of organizational process paradigm. Complex problems are broken down into pieces and then organizations factor them into parts which are to be dealt with different organizations and not one as a whole. Contrary to Rational Actor Model where the rational actor maximizes and optimizes his choice, in organizational process that maximizing is replaced by satisficing which means that the option

³⁷ Allison;pg.67

³⁸ March James and Simon Herbert, *Organizations*, New York, 1958. Here Allison builds on March and Simon's comprehensive rationality to derive five characteristic deviations as quoted; see pg. 71;

with the best possible consequence is chosen and all the rest of the options are not so carefully weighed thus limiting the alternatives. Allison also provides four concepts which link together goals, expectations and choice as follows

“1) Quasi-resolution of conflict (or how conflicting goals are managed by achieving them sequentially)

2) Uncertainty avoidance (or how organizations focus on short-term pressing problems and negotiate with the environment)

3) Problematic search (or how firms search for solutions to problems based on simple minded rules)

4) Organizational learning (or how goals, attention rules, and search procedures are altered).”³⁹

Allison's second model II has many decision makers with the same goals, but who are imperfectly rational and who have incomplete information; however, sometimes, he seems to imply that some of the decision makers have different goals. According to Allison, governments consist of large organizations among which primary responsibility for particular areas is divided. As understood, the actor is not a massive nation or government but rather an assemblage of “loosely allied organizations on top of which government leaders sit”⁴⁰. Government behavior relevant to any important problem reflects the independent output of several organizations, partially coordinated by government leaders. Each organization has a fixed set of standard operating procedures. The behavior of these organizations and consequently that of the government in a particular instance is thus determined primarily by routines established prior to that instance. The leaders can exercise some choice in combining outputs, but the mass of behavior is determined by previously established procedures.

³⁹ Allison combines this with Cyert and March's process-oriented model of organizational choice; pg. 76

⁴⁰ Ibid;80

Allison states that the organizations have parochial priorities, perceptions and interests due to several factors:

- “1. primary responsibility to a narrow set of problems
2. availability of selective information
3. tenure of individuals on the organization
4. small group pressures within the organization and
5. distribution of rewards by the organization”⁴¹

In summing up the organizational process model, the basic unit of analysis is policy seen as organizational output and instead of one rational unitary actor, the fundamental units are organizations. The actions taken by the organizations are determined by routines, standard operating procedures (SOP's), repertoires and the organizations react to standard threats using the standard options available. The only way Allison's Organizational Process Model differs from the Rational Actor Model is through its claim that SOP's guide decision making rather than individuals finding alternatives to maximize their choices and making rational decisions.

Organizational Process Model and Pakistan's detonation:

If we analyze Pakistan's decision to detonate in the light of Organizational Process model then we need to investigate how the standard operating procedures laid the ground work for Pakistan's detonation of nuclear weapons.

Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Capability:

Pakistan's ability to deploy nuclear weapons had been clear since Nawaz Sharif openly stated in August 1994, “I confirm that Pakistan possesses the

⁴¹ Ibid;81

atomic bomb.”⁴² Later on a more official statement came from Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto stating in April 1995,

“We have enough knowledge and capability to make and assemble a nuclear weapon. But we have voluntarily chosen not to either assemble a nuclear weapon, to detonate a nuclear weapon or to export technology.”⁴³

There is a history of continuing arms race between India and Pakistan, but the real threat came from the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) which during the election campaign in India made a statement to the effect that BJP's "national agenda" would include adding nuclear weapons in India's arsenal.⁴⁴ On April 02, 1998 after the statement by Bhartiya Janta Party, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif sent a letter to heads of State/Government of USA, UK, France, Russia, China, Japan, Italy, Belgium, Spain and Germany blaming India for her nuclear ambitions which were destabilizing for South Asia. The Prime Minister urged the international community to help curb the hostile Indian tendencies and promote nuclear nonproliferation in the region.⁴⁵ Followed by this statement; on April 06, 1998 Pakistan successfully conducted an intermediate range missile test, Ghauri with a maximum range of 1,500 kilometers.⁴⁶ This missile was a potential threat to Indian national security because it had a range of 930 miles, capable of hitting major Indian cities.⁴⁷ This test was condemned by the Indian government and sent out clear signals that now Pakistan possesses

⁴² Barber B., “Ex-Premier Declares Pakistan has A-Bomb”, *Washington Times*, August 24, 1994.

⁴³ “Clinton pledges to settle dispute with Pakistan”, *Xinhua*, April 12, 1995, in *FBIS-CHI*, September 27, 1996.

⁴⁴ Foreign Media Reaction, *Daily Digest*, United States Information Agency, Office of Research and Media Reaction. April 10, 1998.

⁴⁵ <http://www.fas.org/news/pakistan/1998/04/980402-pak-let.htm>

⁴⁶ Akhtar Hassan, "Pakistan test-fires Ghauri missile," *Dawn*, 7 April 1998.

⁴⁷ Quoted in Christopher Allan McHorney, “India and Pakistan: Newest Members of the Nuclear Club”, in Ralph Carter ed. (2002): *CONTEMPORARY CASES IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY* (Washington , DC : CQ Press)

the capability to deliver her nuclear bombs through this missile. This missile test by Pakistan was responded by nuclear explosions on May 11 and May 13 by India which confirmed their statements about providing India with strong defenses. After the Indian nuclear tests Pakistan's nuclear scientist Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan gave a statement on May 12 that

“Pakistan has nothing to worry about Indian nuclear tests and is very well placed to meet threats to its security. We are ever ready and will do what the Government decides.”⁴⁸

This statement by Pakistani nuclear scientist clearly reflects the confidence in Pakistan's nuclear weapons capability which was in a ready stage of deployment within a short span of time and the time limit. Pakistan exploded the nuclear devices between May 13 and May 28, which reiterates the claims that Pakistan possessed the nuclear weapons system as well as the system ready for early deployment. Looking at it from a sequential point of view based on an organizational process model, it can be stated that the standard operating procedures were put into place to test the nuclear capability and this came at a time when Pakistan had already tested the long range missile which could carry a nuclear warhead.

Another fact that further strengthens Pakistan's designs to keep her nuclear machinery running and ready for use comes from a report published by David Albright, which stated that since the 1980s Pakistan had been working on a heavy water "research" reactor at Khushab. This reactor was alleged to be "indigenous", but was developed with technical assistance from China which also supplied the heavy water and was not subject to International Atomic Energy

⁴⁸ Qadeer Khan in an interview with *Associated Press of Pakistan*, May 12, 1998.

Agency (IAEA) inspections. Khushab had a capacity variously reported at between 40 MWT to 50 MWT (but as high as 70 MWT). It was "commissioned" in March 1996, but began operating only in April 1998.⁴⁹ It is important to remember here that April 1998 was also the same month when Pakistan tested the Ghauri missile. Therefore, the debate about Pakistan's national security being threatened by Indian nuclear tests of May 11 & 13 and her subsequent claims about insecurities that arose as a result of Indian testing, has lesser weight keeping in mind the calm expressed by Dr. Khan in his statement about Pakistan's response. This scenario is only plausible when one analyzes it from the organizational process model which emphasizes that the standard operating procedures pave the way for decision making.

Pakistan's nuclear explosions: Detonation details:

Understanding Pakistan's nuclear capability is important to understand its final decision to detonate. It is also important from an organizational perspective because it requires organizational competency to undertake such a tremendous task involving high levels of coordination. Pakistan had acquired the ability to test a nuclear device as early as 1984. Following India's abortive bid in 1995 to test its nuclear devices, Pakistan had prepared a nuclear test site in the Chagai district of Southwestern Baluchistan, bordering Iran and Afghanistan. According to Pakistani Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto, Pakistan's "aim was to tell the

⁴⁹ David Albright. 1998. *ISIS Technical Assessment: Pakistan's Efforts to Obtain Unsafeguarded Plutonium are Nearing Fruition*, Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), June 1, 1998.

Indians that their move will be matched” and to send the West “a clear signal that they had better done something to stop the Indians.”⁵⁰

In May 1998, all that Pakistani nuclear scientific state required was the necessary political approval which was withheld until Pakistani decision makers were sure that retaliatory tests would not incur unacceptable diplomatic and economic costs. The order to conduct the tests was given on 18 May, 1998 because an exclusive Defense Committee of the Cabinet (DCC) meeting was held on 16 or 17 May, 1998 and was attended only by the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister (Gohar Ayub Khan), the Finance Minister (Sartaj Aziz) and the three Armed Services Chiefs. This meeting has never been officially acknowledged but it must have been held as neither the Prime Minister nor the Chief of the Army Staff alone could have made the decision to conduct the nuclear tests. The DCC was the only competent authority to decide on this matter, especially since the National Command Authority (NCA), Pakistan’s nuclear command and control authority for its strategic forces, did not exist at that time.⁵¹

From an organizational perspective, the decision remained as to which agency was competent enough to carry out the task of conducting nuclear tests. Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission was said to be the pioneer in setting up the Chagai nuclear test site and was capable of conducting cold testing. Therefore, on 18 May 1998, the Chairman of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) was summoned to the Prime Minister House where he was relayed the

⁵⁰ Quoted in Zahid Hussain’s, “Laying the Groundwork”, *News line*, June 1998;pg.24

⁵¹Rai Muhammad Saleh Azam. 2000. When the Mountains Move - The Story of Chagai, *Defence Journal*, June 2000

decision of the DCC. “Dhamaka kar dein” (Conduct the explosion”) were the exact words used by the Prime Minister to inform him of the Government’s decision to conduct the nuclear tests.⁵² The PAEC Chairman went back to his office and gave orders to his staff to prepare for the tests. Simultaneously, General Head Quarters (GHQ) and Air Headquarters issued orders to the relevant quarters in 12 Corps, Quetta, the National Logistics Cell (NLC), the Army Aviation Corps and No. 6 (Air Transport Support) Squadron respectively to extend the necessary support to the PAEC in this regard. The Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) also directed the national airline, Pakistan International Airline (PIA), to make available a Boeing 737 passenger aircraft at short notice for the ferrying of PAEC officials, scientists, engineers and technicians to Baluchistan.⁵³

After analyzing this account it becomes clear that from the time the order to conduct the explosion was given on May 18 until the time it actually took place on May 28, there was a gap of only 10 days. In these 10 days the test site was prepared, weapons were delivered to the site and necessary preparations were made to conduct the nuclear testing. This suggests that Pakistan had the ability to deliver nuclear arsenals all along, had the place to conduct it on a short notice and finally found the motive to accomplish what it had been trying to do in past years. The Indian nuclear tests gave Pakistan just the right timing and excuse to conduct her nuclear capability. Without this excuse Pakistan would never had been able to declare herself a nuclear weapons state. Therefore, in response to

⁵² http://www.piads.com.pk/users/piads/nuclear_new.html

⁵³ <http://www.defencejournal.com/2000/june/chagai.htm>

Indian tests, Pakistan exploded five devices on May 28. A sixth device was detonated on May 30 which was conducted some 100 kms southwest of Baluchistan, according to seismic analysis. Like their Indian counterparts, Pakistani officials seem to have exaggerated the numbers and size of the explosions, announcing their first day's yield as 40-45 kilotons and a yield of 15-18 kilotons for the test on May 30. Analysis of the seismic data does not support these claims. The average magnitude reported was 4.9 on May 28th and a magnitude of 4.3 on May 30.⁵⁴ According to Dr.Khan, Pakistan's explosion of boosted fission devices used uranium 235 although it was capable of testing a thermonuclear device as well. He further stated that the first enrichment was done on April 4, 1978 and the plant was made operational in 1979 or so. By 1981 Pakistan was producing substantial quantities of uranium.⁵⁵ The enrichment of Pakistan's own uranium production allowed Pakistan the confidence to go ahead with any decision involving nuclear detonation without being hesitant of the competency to carry it out.

Conclusion:

From Organizational Process Model's point of view, I believe that the organizational options were narrowed down to whether Pakistan had the ability to carry out a nuclear explosion or not. After the Prime Minister received an assurance from the Chairman of Atomic Energy Commission that he could trust the proficiency of the technicians involved and technology at hand, it was only a matter of when and not if. If one wants to explain the specific characteristics of

⁵⁴ Terry C. Wallace, "The May 1998 India and Pakistan Nuclear Tests," *Seismological Research letters*, September 1998.

⁵⁵ Qadeer Khan, *The News International*, May 30, 1998;pg.1

governmental action then I believe that Model II is sufficient for that explanation. As proposed by Allison, the existing organizational routine limits the options, which is held true in this case because as analyzed earlier by Model I, Pakistan had three options before making the decision to detonate i.e. to exercise restraint, turn to international community for help or to respond in kind. These options boiled down to simply a question of whether the capability to conduct the tests existed or not. If yes, then how soon and if not, then what?

Organizations are fundamental units according to Model II; therefore in this case, Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), Kahuta Research Laboratories (KRL), the General Head Quarters (GHQ), the Air Headquarters, Civil Aviation Authority at the ground level, the Foreign Ministry and Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) at the policy level, were the main units that played a crucial role in shaping the governmental decision. All of these organizations in their unique capacity assured their support and reflected positively on their capability to carryout the task at hand, which I believe made the governmental choice much easier. Model II also emphasizes that Organizations, by their nature, are parochial and tend to develop set propensities regarding priorities, perceptions, and issues.⁵⁶ This also holds true at this level of analysis because after India conducted its nuclear tests then it became a matter of "ego" for the organizations in Pakistan which claimed over the years to have possessed the nuclear capability and for them to give shape to their claim was then or never. Their priorities were set by their abilities to match Indian claims at the same echelon in an equal response. This over-confidence on part of these

⁵⁶ Allison;81

organizations failed to account for any economic turmoil that was in sight if Pakistan had chosen the nuclear path and also ignored the possible economic and political restraints promised by the international community in wake of any nuclear explosions. The only concern of PAEC and KRL was to have a green signal from the government to carry on with the testing.

The standard operating procedures were set in place and followed as the government of Pakistan processed a go ahead signal to PAEC. If PAEC did not have the capability to conduct nuclear testing then one could have stated that the SOP's were not the guiding light for decision making that was made on May 28, 1998. But the evidence presented above suggests otherwise. The contribution of organizational intelligence is also a strong point in assessing the credibility of Model II. After the Indian tests, Pakistan was reportedly said to be receiving information of a possible attack by India and this is also regarded to be one of the reasons as to why Pakistan hurried into a decision to conduct her own nuclear explosions.

The evidence of organizational intelligence comes from the summoning of Indian high commissioner, Satish Chandra at 1:00 a.m EST on May 27 by Pakistan's Foreign Secretary Ahmed and reiterated that Pakistan possessed credible information of a planned Indian attack on Pakistan's nuclear installations, which was refuted by the Indian high commissioner.⁵⁷ On the basis of this one can state that Model II has some logical implications and keeping in mind the influential nature of SOP's, it can be stated that organizations can guide

⁵⁷ News report on May 28, 1998; Rediff; <http://www.rediff.com/news/1998/may/28bomb3.htm>

the decision making process through following their set standard operating procedures.

So far the explanation provided by Model II when applied in case of Pakistan's detonation holds some logic but some aspects still remain ambiguous. If one accepts the argument about Pakistan, testing its Ghauri missile in April followed by inflammatory statements by Dr. Qadeer regarding its capability and range as analyzed earlier then all seems to fall into sequence. Pakistan was to test this missile in March but the testing was postponed.⁵⁸ The coming into power of BJP government was considered as a threat to Pakistan's national security because it maintained a very strong moratorium on including nukes to India's arsenals for defense purposes without even conducting any tests. Pakistan used the statement by a senior Indian policy official as a base for stating that Indian nuclear ambitions should be curbed and that a nuclear India would be a threat to the regional stability.⁵⁹ I believe that perhaps that was the time when Pakistan started to plan for a response in case the BJP government kept its words and carried on with the nuclear explosions. After BJP's coming into power, there was created much hype about Nuclear India which was one of the strongest points during BJP's election campaign bringing it home electoral victory.⁶⁰ This in itself provides sufficient explanation for Pakistan if any such action took place in the wake of the moment.

⁵⁸ News report on April 06, 1998; Rediff; <http://www.rediff.com/news/1998/apr/06pakbom.htm>

⁵⁹ Ali Zaidi; *Voice of America*, April 25, 1998; <http://www.fas.org/news/pakistan/1998/04/980425-pak.htm>

⁶⁰ *BJP Election Manifesto*: <http://www.bjp.org/manifestes/chap8.htm>

The sequence in which the events line up from the time of BJP government coming into power, Pakistan's postponement of testing its ballistic missile and later on resuming the testing, India responding to the ballistic missile threat by conducting nuclear weapons and Pakistan responding in kind, it seems as if the organizational planning and implementation played a very important role. A thorough analysis of Model II leads me to suggest that perhaps an earlier planning process allowed the nuclear option to be exercised. The standard operating procedures had to be set in place before a decision could be taken which further strengthens the fact that a quicker response to Indian nuclear tests was absent.

It would not be wise to rule out any possibility that Pakistan triggered this whole arms race at that point in time when BJP was in power and Pakistan knew that it was in a critical position to respond to any Pakistani aggression. Pakistan also knew that nuclear policy was at the core of BJP government's policies and there could have been no way they would have restrained from testing the capability which would bring their government long-term stability. Considering this scenario one can state that perhaps the standard operating procedures were laid down to achieve that one objective for which Pakistan needed a viable justification. One thing that relates to the ambiguity of the whole organizational process approach is the internal politics of the organizations that were at play in Pakistan in 1998. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif is on record to state (as analyzed earlier in Chapter II) that Pakistan would refrain from testing. He issued this statement in a televised nation-wide address soon after he condemned Indian

tests and maintained that Pakistan would not follow the same insanity which was the driving force for India. Later on he issued a congratulatory statement that Pakistan successfully conducted five nuclear tests in response to Indian explosions and have settled the score. Model II fails to predict this behavior because according to Allison as mentioned earlier, the leader of the government sits on top of the loosely allied organizations. If we accept this to be true, then it directs us to believe that there was much more internal politics amongst the organizations at the ground level, which did not let the leader, have his way. Given more time, Nawaz Sharif (who was reluctant to begin with) would have had his resolve of choosing the non-nuclear option but before his words could be carried out, the organizational machinery paved a way treading on which became inevitable for him.

In order to understand the politics at play amongst the organizations, which may or may not have been the cause of directing the decision-making, Allison's Model III provides another explanation, which I will analyze in the subsequent chapter. Therefore, as far as the Organizational Process Model's explanation of standard operating procedures steering the decision making is concerned, I believe that Model II does possess some relevance, but as far as the intricate details of decision making is concerned regarding how much influence was placed by the organizations to help close the deal, one will need to find the answers through analyzing Allison's Model III, the Bureaucratic Politics Model (without which the central question of the thesis will still remain unanswered).

CHAPTER IV

MODEL III: BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS MODEL

The last model to explain the national decision-making by Allison finds its basis in bureaucratic politics. The governmental politics model conceives of governmental policy-making not as a rational actor choice or organizational output but resultant of bargaining along regular circuits among players positioned hierarchically within the government. According to Allison, the government's decisions are resultants because

“what happens is not chosen as a solution to a problem but rather results from compromise, conflict and confusion of officials with diverse influence and unequal influence.”⁶¹

In this model, the political actors and their intentions, positions and interests, their relative power, the action channels through which the political actors input and exert their influence, decision rules and similar matters stand to the fore in analysis. Allison has arranged the organizing concepts of this model by explaining the players in position with their parochial priorities and perceptions. He states that

“The governmental actor is neither a unitary actor nor a conglomerate of organizations, but rather is a number of individual players.”⁶²

These individuals are players in the game of national security policy and their actions and preferences stem from the position they occupy. Allison identifies these players as

“Chiefs (heads of different organizations), staffers (immediate staff of each chief), Indians (permanent government officials in each organization) and ad hoc

⁶¹ Allison;162

⁶² Ibid;164

players (press, interest groups spokespersons and public from concentric circles).⁶³

One interesting detail that follows after identifying their positions is their way of dealing with the issue in question considering their priorities and interests. Allison states that

“answers to the question “what is the issue?” are colored by the position from which the question is considered.”⁶⁴

This explains as to why there never is unanimity in decisions because every position held in the organization contributes to a different point of view, unlike the assumptions of Allison’s Model I according to which the action taken by the unitary actor is intentional. Allison however, lays much emphasis on the Indians (as specified earlier) who are responsible for framing, finding alternatives and finally pushing the proposal to the Chiefs. According to Allison any issue in policy making has three sides to it which can be defined in the context of Indians’ point of view:

“the issue looking down is options; the issue looking sideways is commitment and the issue looking upward is confidence.”⁶⁵

The issue defined as options is considered to be a way of preserving the Indians’ own room for maneuver until things become clearer. Commitment is the sideways issue which includes how others can be convinced to join Indians’ own beliefs. Finally the confidence Allison talks about is the issue of looking upward entailing that the Indians give confidence to the chief to do what must be done. Allison explains this point further by clarifying Neustadt’s declaration that

⁶³ Ibid;165

⁶⁴ Ibid;166

⁶⁵ Ibid;177

“the essence of any responsible official’s task is to persuade other players that his version of what needs to be done is what their own appraisal of their own responsibilities requires them to do in their own interests.”⁶⁶

I believe this to be a very important point in explaining as to how the Indians succeed in influencing the Chiefs and shaping their decisions by merely giving them confidence in doing something that already is in accordance with their duties and responsibilities. Thus, in order to sum up Model III, I will use the aphorism used by Allison “where you stand depends on where you sit.”⁶⁷ In contrast to the notion that there exists some single national interest, there is an array of organizations and therefore there are bureaucratic interests overriding the one national interest. Each *bureau* argues that its interests align with the national interest, but in reality there are many separate interests. This politics is what constitutes Allison’s bureaucratic politics model, which provides explanation for a national decision resulting as a competition between the interests pursued by these different bureaus. According to conclusions drawn by Allison, Model II illuminates the organizational routines that produce the information, alternatives and action and it is within the context that Model III emerges. As Allison states:

“Model III focuses in greater detail on the individual leaders of a government and politics among them that determine major governmental choices.”⁶⁸

Since, Model II and Model III draw great resemblances from each other and Model III bases its further ground of explanation (of a governmental choice of action) derived from the postulates of Model II; I would apply Model III as follows.

⁶⁶ Ibid. Allison quotes from Richard Neustadt, *Presidential Power*, New York. 1960; Chapter 3.

⁶⁷ Ibid;176

⁶⁸ Ibid;258

Model III when applied will explain which players in what positions were centrally involved and what were the existing channels of action available to them.

Bureaucratic Politics Model and Pakistan's detonation:

In order to apply Model III for explaining Pakistan's detonation in 1998, it is important to recognize that the governmental action is a political resultant, which according to this Model forms the basic unit of analysis. Therefore, to analyze Model III and the organizing concepts as proposed by Allison, I will answer the same set of questions as Allison asked, but in the context of Pakistan's decision to go nuclear. Allison posed four interrelated questions:

“Who plays? What determines each player's stand? What determines each player's relative influence? How does the game combine player's stand, influence and moves to yield governmental decisions and actions?”⁶⁹

Chiefs, staffers, Indians and ad hoc players

The dramas lengthy cast of characters were players in the national security policy game by virtue of their position. They were the civilians in the Parliamentary administration of Nawaz Sharif and the military players in the General Head Quarters (GHQ). In order to identify the players whose interests and actions effect the governmental decision, I will break them down into players in position as explained earlier i.e. Chiefs, staffers, Indians and ad hoc players. The *Chiefs* would include the president, prime minister, parliamentarians, foreign minister, cabinet members, Chiefs of the Armed Forces, COAS as head of the General Head Quarters (GHQ), Head of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), Head of Kahuta Research Laboratories (KRL), Chief of Civil Aviation Authority (CIA), Governors and Chief of Inter Services Intelligence (ISI).

⁶⁹ Ibid;164

The Indian nuclear tests created a situation in which the Pakistani leadership saw both an even greater need to test and a possible opening to justify the test as a response that was both politically and strategically understandable. By 1998, the Pakistani military had grown very sensitive to the decline of its conventional military capabilities after US cooperation was stopped by the Pressler Amendment in 1990. Between 1990 and 1996, Pakistan became dependent on Chinese arms when some US military equipment that had been paid for in 1980s was released under "one-time waiver". Every major arms supplier was involved in cooperation with India at that time.⁷⁰ Pakistan's loss of its arms supplier (US) to India, led to a feeling of abandonment and resentment. Chair of national Assembly's Standing Committee for Defense Affairs stated that "The order in conventional arms has now been disturbed to a great extent."⁷¹ The feeling of abandonment reinvigorated the military's interest in nuclear deterrence of conventional war.

On the political front, despite pressures from the military and the opportunity opened by the Indian tests, Nawaz was apparently reluctant to authorize them. On May 19, 1998 a week after the Indian tests he stated that

"Why we are not testing is because of the fact that I want to show the world that Pakistan is a responsible country. If India is doing it out of sheer madness, we do not have to blindly follow the suit."⁷²

⁷⁰ U.S-India Defense ties became better in the mid 90's when Pakistan was still suffering from the Pressler amendment. This US shift towards India, left Pakistan dependent on Chinese reliance for arms. This reference explains the not so favorable US tilt toward India. In 1995, Bruce O. Reidel, the deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, told Congress, "US-Indian defense ties are better now than at any time in the past 30 years". US House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations and US Interests in South Asia (US Government Printing Office: Washington 1997) p.96.

⁷¹ Cheema, *The News International*, April 23, 1998;p.1

⁷² Quoted in Sheikh, S, "Pakistan not to sit back if India attacks, declares Nawaz", *The News International*, May 20, 1998.

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was hesitant to test and was genuinely concerned about the impact economic sanctions will have on Pakistan in the wake of any nuclear tests. Within his cabinet, differences of opinion existed. Some factions supported and some opposed nuclear testing, thus attempted to influence the public opinion through broadcast and print media.⁷³ But those officials who opposed did not carry much weight as far as their position of influencing the decision making was concerned. But on the other hand, Pakistan military's thinking was influenced by factors such as prestige as well as perceptions of an Indian threat. Senior military personnel believed that, "We will never be able to remove the nuclear imbalance if we do not follow suit with our own explosion."⁷⁴ Therefore, the internal balance tilted towards a retaliatory response resulting in May 1998 Pakistani nuclear detonation. In the perceptions of Pakistan's authoritative decision makers, US military and economic incentives did not measure favorably against issues of prestige and credibility.

Under pressure from the military, Nawaz Sharif warned President Clinton that the decision "was out of my hands", implying that the military high command was ultimately responsible for Pakistan's nuclear response.⁷⁵ Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) also remained a very active player and helped shaped the decision making especially where the nuclear explosions of 1998 were concerned. Pakistani intelligence gathered some sources stating that two American fighter jets were spotted at a Forward Operating Indian airbase on May

⁷³ Quoted in Zahid Hussain, "The Bomb and After", *Newsline* (June 1998), pg: 22-23. A pro-test official argued that Pakistan had "no other choice but to go for our own test", while another official opposing the testing argued that "a nuclear test would be a disaster for Pakistan".

⁷⁴ Quoted in Zahid Hassan, "Laying the Groundwork", *Newsline* (June 1998), p.24

⁷⁵ Quoted in Michael Hirsh and John Barry, "Nuclear Jitters", *Newsweek*, June 08, 1998, p.16

27. It was stated that they were there to take out Pakistan's nuclear installation backed by an Indian plan to sever the Pakistani response to its nuclear explosions of May 11 and 13, 1998.⁷⁶ Therefore, on the basis of this intelligence reported, though later on denied by Indian officials, led Pakistani government to finalize the decision either for or against the nuclear detonation. The results of the Defense Committee of the Cabinet (DCC) as discussed in analysis of Model II in previous chapter as well, indicated that it was only the Minister of Finance & Economic Affairs, Sartaj Aziz who opposed the tests keeping in mind the repercussions that Pakistan would have to face in the wake of imposition of heavy economic sanctions.⁷⁷

The meeting was attended by all the *Chiefs* as Allison has termed, which included the Prime Minister of Pakistan, the Minister of Defense, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Gohar Ayub Khan, the Minister of Finance & Economic Affairs, Sartaj Aziz, the Foreign Secretary, Shamshad Ahmed Khan and the three Chiefs of Staff of the Army, Air Force and Navy, namely General Jehangir Karamat, Air Chief Marshal Pervaiz Mehdi Qureshi and Admiral Fasih Bokhari respectively.⁷⁸ All of them favored Pakistan carrying on with the nuclear explosions with the exception of Aziz.

Allison defines *staffers* as the immediate staff of each Chief and *Indians* as the permanent political appointees which would be the civil service machinery in case of Pakistan, but where nuclear detonation decision is concerned, I have failed to find any reference whatsoever to support this claim that staffers and

⁷⁶ http://www.geocities.com/ikramulhaq_1999/18.html

⁷⁷ <http://nuketesting.enviroweb.org/hew/Pakistan/PakTests.html>

⁷⁸ http://www.piads.com.pk/users/piads/nuclear_new.html

even Indians were players in position and had some influence on decision making. I would, however, include ad hoc players in my application of Model III which includes press and influential groups having substantial influence in strengthening the decision that was taken. Public opinion and the opinions collected by think tank organizations carried some weight in influencing the governmental decision. Former chairman of the Institute of Strategic Studies in Islamabad, said, "We have to come out and achieve a certified nuclear status. The price is going to be very, very heavy but we have to be prepared to pay that."⁷⁹

Domestic political pressures made it exceedingly difficult for Sharif to exercise the non-nuclear option. Emotion-charged demonstrators took to the streets in several cities to burn Indian flags and to demand that the government reply to India's nuclear tests with tests of its own. Opposition political leaders were demanding quick nuclear detonations. Among them was former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, who told a television interviewer in London that without such tests, "India will have an upper hand and will resort to aggression against Pakistan at its own sweet will."⁸⁰ Beyond these political pressures lie cold strategic calculations. The Prime Minister decided to consult the leaders of national political parties on the situation arising out of the Indian nuclear tests. The purpose of such consultations was to elicit their opinion in order to achieve a national consensus on the policy Pakistan should adopt to deal with the

⁷⁹ Muratza Pooya, *The News International*, May 13, 1998 pg.2

⁸⁰ Quoted in Kinzer, Stephen, "Pakistan Under World Pressure to Refrain From Nuclear Tests," *New York Times*, May 15, 1998;pg.1

situation.⁸¹ Therefore, these interest groups or think tank organizations helped raise the public sentiments toward a nuclear response from Pakistan and “reveal” that the domestic pressure molded the government’s decision to not settle for anything else. This shows that the ad hoc players did hold a position in national decision making and thus in some characteristic influenced governmental action.

Compromise, Coalition, Competition and Confusion

Each player brought assorted parochial baggage to the table. Individual priorities, perceptions and problems contributed to the pulling and hauling between various government officials from which the whole scenario of responding to Indian nuclear tests in kind evolved. Accordingly, the decision taken by Pakistan to detonate was not a conscious policy decision by a unitary rational actor and as explained by Allison:

“It was an outcome resulting from compromise, coalition, competition and confusion among government officials who see different faces of an issue.”⁸²

A review of perceptions, interests and actions will help explicate Allison’s models further. As explained earlier, the interest pursued by the military was far different and long term than that pursued by the political organizations or even the ad hoc players for that matter (the public and interest groups). The goals and interests that affect players’ desired outcomes include national security interests, organizational interests, domestic interests and personal interests.

Regarding the competition between the players, it was a difficult decision to reach as to whether the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) should carry out the nuclear testing or the Kahuta Research Laboratories (KRL) and

⁸¹ <http://www.fas.org/news/pakistan/1998/05/980516-pbc.htm>

⁸² Allison; pp 70-71

finally on May 18, 1998 the task was assigned to PAEC. When news reached Dr. A.Q. Khan at KRL that PAEC will carry out the nuclear testing, he lodged a strong protest with the Chief of Army Staff, General Jehangir Karamat. The Army Chief, in turn, called the Prime Minister. Amongst the two, it was decided that KRL personnel would also be involved in the nuclear test preparations and present at the time of testing alongside those of the PAEC.⁸³ What determines each player's impact on results is what Allison terms as "power". This power stems from the position held by the player, their expertise and control over information, power to identify options and estimate feasibilities which enables chiefs to implement decisions.⁸⁴ This aspect can be determined by the ability and assurances given by PAEC to the Prime Minister that the operation can be carried out as all the technological capabilities were in order. This gave confidence to the Chiefs (the Prime Minister and COAS) to go ahead and finalize the decision.

Conclusion:

After analyzing the basic concepts of Model III and implementing it, there still are many vacuums left which need to be filled. For these vacuums, Model III fails to predict the course. As far as the players are concerned, Model III provides a useful explanation about the *actions emanating from the position held by the actors*. In the case of Pakistan's detonation, there was a very strong position possessed by different players. The Foreign Minister was executing his power by issuing strong statements that came out right after India conducted its nuclear

⁸³ http://www.piads.com.pk/users/piads/nuclear_new.html

⁸⁴ Allison; pp. 168-169

tests accusing it of always having possessed a covert developing and testing of her nuclear program.⁸⁵ This shows that the Foreign Ministry of Pakistan held a very strong hawkish position on the Indian nuclear tests. The bureaucratic machinery of Nawaz's government took a very firm stand in blaming the international community for not taking the warnings by the Pakistani government about Indian nuclear tests into serious consideration. Sharif and later the Foreign Minister assured the public that all measures would be taken to safeguard national security and that any response from Pakistan was backed by the military's capability to match it.⁸⁶

The role that Pakistan's Army played in Pakistan's politics has always remained distinguished and Indo-centric. All the defensive strategies are based on a threat from India which out-powers Pakistan by her conventional military strength. This was further aggravated when India tested her nuclear tests and called Pakistan's bluff of having nuclear weapons capability. Pakistan's defense policy is inseparable from its foreign policy to a larger extent, taking into consideration its Indo-centric defense policy. As a commentator has aptly remarked,

"Military needs had to command foreign policy. And because foreign and defense policies are for the new states a matter of survival they seriously affect domestic policy. By this chain of logic the leader of Pakistan army is propelled into the centre of decision-making and first its arbitrator and then its monopolist."⁸⁷

⁸⁵ Official statement from Pakistan following India's nuclear tests, May 12, 1998
<http://www.ciw.org/coalition/pak0511.htm>

⁸⁶ "Sharif blames the West", *Hindu*, May 13, 1998

⁸⁷ Wayne Wilcox, "Political Role of the Army in Pakistan: Some Reflections" in S.P. Verma and V. Narain eds., *Pakistan Political System in Crisis: Emergence of Bangladesh*, (Jaipur: University of Rajasthan Press, 1972), p. 35.

After the Indo-Pak tension boiled over Kashmir in 1990, Pakistan accelerated its uranium enrichment program. The decision was taken by the President and Chief Of the Army Staff (COAS). This is admitted by Benazir herself during an interview to ABC television.⁸⁸ This statement indicates the military nature of Pakistan's nuclear programme where the civilians hardly have any say. It is not surprising that some reports point out that no prime minister has ever been allowed to visit the nuclear facility in Kahuta.⁸⁹

Nawaz Sharif was aware of the reality after the embargo of US economic and military aid to Pakistan. The enrichment programme was capped, but he did not have any authority to roll back the nuclear programme to appease the Americans. He expressed his constraint in his interview to Barbara Crossette in June 1991, that although he wanted to take a flexible position, he could not since he was constrained by certain factors which pointed to the hard-liners in the military.⁹⁰ All these indicate that the civilians have hardly any role in the matter of defense decision-making. This brief discussion on military's role in Pakistan suggests the civil-military relationship that forms the basis of bureaucratic politics and was at play in 1998 as well. This proves the basic and most important postulate of Model III, which states *action as a political resultant*. According to Allison

"Each player pulls and hauls with the power at his discretion for outcomes that will advance his conception of national, organizational, group and personal interests."⁹¹

⁸⁸ Quoted in Zahid Hussain, "The Bomb Controversy", *News line*, November 1991, p. 26.

⁸⁹ George Perkovich, "A Nuclear Third Way in South Asia", *Foreign Policy*, no. 91, Summer 1993, p. 90.

⁹⁰ Quoted in Barbara Crossette, "Pakistan Asks Talks on Atomic Spread", *New York Times*, June 7, 1991.

⁹¹ Allison;171

In light of the above statement, one thing is clear; that both the military and the civilian establishments (leaving the Prime Minister aside) were willing to go ahead with the nuclear response to India's nuclear explosion. The commanding structure of the military explained above clarifies the authority it possesses where the foreign and defense policy issues are concerned. But, the conflicting statements from the Prime Minister as discussed previously, as well as in this chapter, remain a confusing issue.

The Prime Minister heads the civilian establishment, heads the bureaucracy and also holds the title of Minister of Defense but still, what I fail to understand is his role as head of the state. I believe that the Foreign Ministry and the Military's hawkish tendencies played a game which only satisfied their own interests and there was no conflict among the civil-military at that point in time in 1998. The lessons drawn from this aspect lead to the conclusion that both the civilian and the military establishments possessed one voice regarding the nuclear issue and when they pursued the same agenda there was no *pulling and hauling* amongst them. Thus this environment defies the postulate that *bureaucratic politics* exists. At least, in this case as I understand, the intra-bureaucratic politics was almost non-existent because the three most important bureaus, the political government, the military and the PAEC were in complete agreement with each other to carry on the nuclear testing. As far as the intra-bureaucratic politics is concerned, no reference is found what so ever which would reveal that there was clash amongst individual players within the same

organization (with only Aziz taking a different stance which being the only example, becomes irrelevant).

Therefore, after analyzing all the postulates, I believe that this Model does not provide enough explanation that “pulling and hauling” existed (from the evidence gathered. Sharif’s claims to the international community being helpless by the domestic pressures and his statement to President Clinton about the situation being out of his hands, suggest that he had a limited degree of influence. But another way to analyze Sharif’s statements could also suggest that perhaps these conflicting statements in the beginning were made for a face saving situation in front of the International community. He probably also could have used the stance of “helplessness” to appease President Clinton with whom he is on record for exchanging several intense phone conversations.

Model III has proved useful in identifying the Chiefs and the views they held while being in a position of authority. It also helped to reveal certain pressures that were inflicted on Sharif. Therefore, after a complete analysis of Model III, it is safe to state that the governmental decision was a “political resultant” and not a single intentional “choice” made by Pakistan.

I believe that there are many other factors that influence a governmental decision making besides the bureaucracy and politics it entails. Religion, geo-political structure, technology, international actors, capital resources, GNP of a country and much more together determines a certain national decision making. Unless all that is taken into account, a complete rationalization of a decision cannot be provided. This is where Model III alone does not suffice the

explanation of national decision making and is a research limitation for Model III.

Perhaps historians will later find some "*Indians*" and more information will be disclosed. We are also limited because of free access to bureaucratic deliberations that were undertaken at that time which, once accessed will surely unveil certain hidden facts.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this thesis was to apply Graham Allison's national decision making model to answer why Pakistan opted to go nuclear in 1998. Past research indicates how difficult it is to apply Allison's models in their entirety. The literature review presented in this thesis reveals more criticisms of the models than it does the applicability. Various authors have criticized the models from the International Relations perspective as well as from the Public Administration's point of view. This thesis attempted to apply the models of Rational Actor, Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics from an international politics perspective.

After applying the three models, I conclude that all three of them have some insights to offer in answering the main question of the thesis. The usefulness of Rational Actor Model (Model I) in applying it to the Pakistani case comes from it predicting the governmental action as a "choice" that maximized Pakistan's strategic goals. Model I also helped in envisaging Pakistan as a national actor which identified the problem and searched for alternatives to solve that problem. But for Model I, a serious limitation that my research suffered from was analyzing Pakistan's decision to detonate as a "unitary actor". There is no way that the rationality of this decision could be explained through gauging the unitary actor model because of the complexity of the events that led to the decision. Also the involvement of various internal and external actors, clouds our assumptions which are conflicting with the basic concepts of Model I.

The Organizational Process Model (Model II) however proved quite useful in its application in this particular case. Firstly, the organizational process model is very technical in its applicability. Since Pakistan's going nuclear involved technicalities which could only have been revealed through the powerful explanation Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) provide therefore, most of my queries were answered through a deeper analysis of Model II. During my research I unveiled certain sequences of events which otherwise would never have been revealed had I not used the "Organizational Process Model". A fruitful line of research is likely to be found in Model II which could be helpful in providing a whole different outlook to the question posed. After applying the Organizational Process Model, I find it interesting to suggest that Pakistan's testing of the Ghauri Missile in April 1998 was likely the result of BJP coming in power in March 1998. BJP has always maintained a strong nuclear posture which I believe was used by Pakistan to flex her own nuclear muscle. After testing Ghauri in April 98, it provided Pakistan with a delivery vehicle which could carry nuclear warhead with a range that could make India vulnerable. This scenario did not leave Indian government comfortable and pushed them to resort to a response which was no less than nuclear. This also helped them call Pakistan's bluff about possessing nuclear capability which Pakistan always maintained it had.

Applying Model II helped me divulge that probably the Standard Operating Procedures were set into motion in the first place so to achieve the very same response which India provided Pakistan by detonating her nuclear devices on

May 11 & 13 in 1998. This in turn gave Pakistan an edge over India to play her “national security” card which has been used for so many instances in the past. Only this time it worked as a double edged sword which helped Pakistan show the rest of the world how insecure she was with India going nuclear. Although there is no solid reference to back up my statement here but I do strongly believe that the sequence in which the events fell as unfolded by the application of Model II, it bears a very good relevance to what might have initiated a decision. This lack of reference to support my claims leads me to the limitation of my research.

The Bureaucratic Politics Model (Model III) also provided some useful insights into the matter of Pakistan choosing to detonate. The basic concept of Model III successfully suggested that the governmental action was a political resultant rather than a choice (refuting the claims of Model I). It also helped clarify the players in position with their parochial priorities. But I believe that identification of the Chiefs of various different bureaus leaves us suspended where the pulling and hauling between the bureaus is concerned. Allison’s Model III is beneficial in analysis only when there is a clear bureaucratic politics involved within the bureaus and outside the bureaus. In this case as research shows, the bureaucratic politics was missing and thus failed to reveal how much influence it actually had (or could have had) in shaping the decision taken by the Prime Minister.

While conducting research on a foreign policy issue one is bound to fall into a vacuum where an absence of data exists. This is exactly what my research suffers from. There were many times during this research when I reached a dead

end while trying to answer some questions regarding the defensive posture of Pakistan or some closed door debates between the troika of the Prime Minister, the Chief of the Army Staff and the General Head Quarters (GHQ). The official documents were not revealed at the time Pakistan went nuclear and they are not available to a non-military source to date. This caused some serious problems because I am so certain that some official comments or documentaries of the official meetings that took place between May 13 and May 28 could reveal some undisclosed hidden agendas.

There also exist some limitations to Allison's Models as well. During my research I found it very hard to resist taking into account roles that "external" agents play in shaping a policy issue. These external agents in Pakistan's case were the International actors which influenced Pakistan's decision to detonate. They include the United States with President Clinton being on the forefront, it includes the BJP government (and the whole geo-political environment that is inevitable for Pakistan not to take into account while making a foreign policy decision) and it also includes China as a country which aided Pakistan's nuclear program. Without their clandestine help Pakistan would never have been able to achieve the capability in the first place let alone test it. Clinton's position and influence is very important because had the Clinton administration provided Pakistan with more attractive economic deals than it did, perhaps the decision would have been different. BJP government after coming into power was responsible of coaxing the anti-Pakistani sentiments in their nation and kept a

very strong nuclear moratorium. Pakistan's decision to detonate was definitely suffering from all these international factors influencing in one way or the other.

All these factors helped shape Pakistan's decision. Allison's three Models do not allocate for these International or geo-political concerns, which I believe are so important in analyzing any national or foreign policy decision making. I believe that all the three models tend to focus greatly on the internal actors or players that play a role in shaping any decision.

One more limitation which I found with the applicability of Allison's Models is that perhaps it is a model to test decisions taken by only the Western styled democratic institutions. My reason for saying this is that in analyzing from a third world country's perspective, I maintain that it is very important to understand the psychology under which these nations operate in. Allison's three Models fall short in this argument because they are very rigid in their claim. They do not have any room for any psychological reasoning which sometimes drives nations to take up a certain course. And nations like Pakistan bring a huge psychological baggage with them before they make massive decisions like matching India's nuclear capability in kind. I trust that there still is much room left for further research but only if there is access to official documents, which might be revealed years from now. May be then we will finally find a more complete answer regarding why Pakistan chose to respond to Indian nuclear tests with nuclear explosions of her own when the alternatives to that decision if approached rationally could have provided a better future for the whole nation.